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COMMENT
The United States' Enforcement of the
Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora
I. INTRODUCTION
Species loss is an extremely serious, continuing problem. While
habitat destruction poses one of the most imminent threats to the sur-
vival of wild animals and plants, international trade in wildlife is also a
major cause of diminishing biological diversity worldwide. The global
market for wildlife is very large, and the goods involved are usually lux-
ury items, such as fur coats and ivory carvings. When this trade is not
harnessed, it often tips the balance toward extinction for various forms of
wildlife.
It has been estimated that international wildlife trade is responsible
for the endangerment of 40% of the vertebrate species now facing extinc-
tion.1 Numerous plants and animals have been affected. For example,
70,000 elephants have been disappearing annually.' In 1979, a continen-
tal survey showed the population of elephants in Africa to be over one
million.3 Today, the number has declined to approximately 750,000.4
The number of rhinoceroses has also decreased dramatically from 60,000
1 S. FITZGERALD, THE INTRNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: WHOSE BUSINESS Is IV7 4 (1989)
[hereinafter S. FZGERALD].
2 Letter from Paul T. Schindler, President of the African Wildlife Foundation, New York, NY
(1989).
3 Every Year, 70,000 Dead Elephants, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1989, at A22, Col. 1.
4 Harare.Jou=aa- Where ElephantsRoam, a Plea for Understanding, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1989,
at A4, col. 3.
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in 1970 to a mere 3,800 in 1988.1
Some may ask why diminishing biological diversity is a concern,
and, similarly, why the level of international wildlife trade even matters.
From an ethical standpoint, it may be argued that it is our moral respon-
sibility to conserve wildlife. Not only is it cruel to unnecessarily destroy
other living organisms, but it also should be our duty to conserve natural
resources and wildlife for the benefit of future generations. Natural eco-
systems consist of delicate and complicated networks of interdependent
relationships. The loss of one species may initiate a vicious cycle result-
ing in irreparable damage to the environment. For example, in Bangla-
desh, India, and Indonesia, the bullfrog is the natural predator of the
mosquito. Experts attribute malarial mosquito infestation in these coun-
tries partly to the yearly harvests of 250 million wild frogs for the frog-
leg trade.6
From a utilitarian perspective, other practical problems result from
species loss. First, as increasing numbers of species disappear, the oppor-
tunities for human beings to conduct basic scientific research on those
lost species also disappear. Such research can generate helpful informa-
tion on biological systems and evolutionary processes. Biomedical re-
search involving apes and monkeys has resulted in the production of
various vaccines and has shed light on the etiology of diseases such as
cancer and hepatitis. Second, since many species of plants and animals
provide essential medicinal sources for human beings, the loss of numer-
ous species may have critical consequences. For example, alkaloid ex-
tracts from the periwinkle, a flowering plant in Madagascar, have been
used to treat illnesses such as Hodgkins disease and leukemia. In fact,
approximately 25% of prescriptions in the United States call for an in-
gredient derived primarily from tropical plants.7 Finally, certain species
of wildlife are important potential nutritional sources for humans.
Marine fishes, for example, are a very valuable source of protein, with
various ocean fishes providing 14% of the world's protein.' For these
reasons, among others, it is vital that human beings try to ensure the
survival of wildlife.
International cooperation is essential to the protection of wild fauna
S Conservationists Worldwide are Determined to Save the Elephant, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1989,
at A18, col. 4.
6 S. FITZGERALD, supra note I, at 5.
7 Id. See also Smith, The Endangered Species Act and Biological Conservation, 57 S. CAL. L.
REv. 361 (1984) [hereinafter Smith].
8 Smith, supra note 7, at 374-75. See also P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 67 (1981); R. PP..scoTr-AL-
LEN & C. PRESCOTT-ALLEN, WHAT'S WILDLIFE WORTH? (1982).
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and flora from over-exploitation resulting from international trade. The
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora ("CITES") is one mechanism for controlling the trade
that is partially responsible for the endangerment of various plants and
animal worldwide.
9
Most recently, CITES was employed to put a stop to the killing of
African elephants, -which were estimated to become extinct by the year
2000 if no action were taken to manage the ivory trade. In June of 1989,
the United States declared a complete ban on ivory imports in order to
help ensure the survival of the elephant. Subsequently, the European
Community and Japan, the other major consumers of ivory, halted im-
ports as well.10 By the October 1989 meeting of the CITES members in
Switzerland, most of the parties to the treaty had agreed to a complete
global ban on trade in ivory. This ban became effective on January 18,
1990.11
As for the United States, the potential effectiveness of CITES has
not yet been fully realized for three main reasons.1 First there are defi-
ciencies in the language of the CITES and its statutory correlate, 13 the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA").14 Second, the administrative bodies
that implement the treaty in the United States have been reluctant to
strictly enforce the Convention. Third, the courts have improperly lim-
9 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened
for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249 [hereinafter CITES].
10 US, the EC, and Japan Halt Ivory Imports, Focus-World Wildlife Fund Newsletter, Sum-
mer 1989, at 1 (Vol. 11, No. 4).
IU CTES Bans All Trade in Elephant Ivory, Focus-World Wildlife Fund Newsletter, Special
Report 1990, at 1 (Vol. 12, No. 1); Global Trade in Ivory is Banned to Protect the African Elephant,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,1989, at Al, col. 2. As anticipated, China and five ivory-exporting countries-
Botswana, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, took exception to the bar. Unfortunately,
and quite unexpectedly, the United Kingdom decided that pursuant to the CITES reservation clause,
it would reserve the right to continue the ivory trade in Hong Kong for six months. Permitting
Hong Kong to trade 670 tons of its stockpiled ivory could give rise to a great deal'of ivory smug-
gling. Ivory Trade Continues in HongKong, Focus-World Wildlife Fund Newsletter, Spring 1990, at
1 (Vol. 12, No. 2).
12 The United States may legitimately claim to have one of the most sophisticated CITES en-
forcement programs of all the signatories to the treaty. However, even the United States has much
room to improve in its implementation of the Convention. For discussion of CITES enforcement in
Europe, Latin America, and Asia, see Thomsen and Brautigam, CITES in the European Economic
Community: Who Benefits?, 5 B.U. Ir4'L LU. 269 (1987); Fitzgerald, Fuller & Hemley, V ldlife
Trade Law Implementation in Developing Countries: The Experience of Latin America, 5 B.U. It'L
I.. 289 (1987); McFadden, Asian Compliance with CITE&" Problems and Prospects, 5 B.U. INTr'L
L-. 311 (1987).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 61-78. The Convention requires that the member nations
promulgate laws to enforce the treaty since CITES is not self-effectuating.
14 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982) [hereinafter ESA].
15 See infra text accompanying notes 82-106. The ESA designates the Secretary of the Interior
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ited their own power to review agency determinations involving the Con-
vention.16 Since administrative action enforcing CITES has been
ineffective, it is both possible and desirable for the judiciary to play a
larger role in enforcing the Convention.
Section II of this Comment provides a factual background on inter-
national trade in endangered species. Section III sets forth the statutory
framework of CITES, describes the pertinent sections of the ESA, and
explains the deficiencies in CITES and the ESA which hinder law en-
forcement. The last section of this Comment, which is divided into three
parts, evaluates the United States' efforts to execute the Convention. The
first part assesses the effectiveness of administrative action by analyzing
prior administrative hearings and appeals involving the Convention. The
second part discusses the availability and scope of judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions under the ESA. The third part briefly examines
cases involving the forfeiture provisions of the ESA, which seem to re-
flect rigid enforcement of the treaty. An overall consideration of the
cases involving CITES implementation, however, leads to the conclusion
that administrative enforcement should be more rigorous. As long as it
is not, the judiciary should assume a more active, role in ensuring that the
United States achieves the objectives of the Convention.17
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES AND
ArrEMP'S AT PROTECTION
Wildlife usually is exported from Africa, Asia, and Latin America,
and is imported into North America, Europe, and Japan."8 The group of
purchasers of wildlife is quite diverse and includes zoos, art dealers, pri-
vate collectors, museum directors, and researchers. 9 Trade in wildlife
has become a very lucrative business.2" Thousands of species of wild
as the authority responsible for implementing the Convention. The United States Fish and Wildlife
Service is the administrative agency that executes the functions of the Secretary of the Interior.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 118-150. Even though the courts have great latitude in
reviewing administrative enforcement of CITES, the judiciary has generally veered away from con-
ducting such review.
17 If courts are careful not to let inadequately supported agency decisions stand, judicial review
may serve as an effective system of checks and balances to ensure strict compliance with CITES.
18 Comment, Regulation of International Trade in Wildlife, I B.U. INT'L LJ. 249, 250-251
(1982) [hereinafter Regulation ofInternational Trade]. Southeast Asia is one of the world's major
wildlife-exporting regions. Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Thailand are all notorious for
their illegal activity in wildlife trade. Letter from Russell E. Train, Chairman of the Board, World
Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter Train Letter].
19 Regulation of International Trade, supra note 18, at 250-251.
20 T. INSKIPP & S. WELLS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE, 27-28 (1979). The path to
extinction begins when poachers kill animals that are highly sought after on the black market. Deal-
ers are willing to pay high prices for such animals since they can be resold for much more on the
US. Enforcement of Endangered Species Convention
10:541(1990)
fauna and flora are entangled in international trade, with the total vol-
ume amounting to a declared value of over $5 billion annually.21 The
United States is the largest trader of wildlife, accounting for an estimated
one-fifth of this reported world market.22 The value of illegal trade in
wildlife is more difficult to assess, but in the late 1970s it was estimated to
be between $50 and $100 million, or even more, annually.'
Efforts to extend protection to wildlife in commerce began in the
early 1900s when Congress passed the Lacey Act.24 The amended ver-
sion of the Act provides that "it is unlawful for any person... to import,
illegal trade market. The profits are extraordinarily high for poachers and dealers in this billion-
dollar-a-year business. Train Letter, supra note 18.
21 Kosloff & Trexler, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora: Enforcement Theory and Practice in the United States, 5 B.U. IN'L LJ. 327,328-
329 (1987) (citing World Wildlife Fund, Factsheet: World Trade in Wildlife (Dec. 1986)) [hereinaf-
ter Kosloff & Trexler].
22 New Lab TakesAim atllegalAnimal Trade, LA. Times, July 30, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2. The
Trade Records Analysis of Fauna and Flora in International Commerce (CRAFFIC"), a program
of the World Wildlife Fund, monitors international trade in wild plants and animals. TRAFFIC
revealed that in one year the United States imported over $18.5 million worth of live fish and shell-
fish, over S5 million worth of live mammalq, reptiles, and amphibians, over 700,000 live birds, almost
11 million animal and reptile skins, over 700,000 mounted or stuffed animals, and approximately $8
million worth of ivory articles. Regulation of International Trade, supra note 18, at 251-252 (citing
telephone interview with David Mack, Assistant Director, TRAFFIC).
TRAFFIC is a major leader of the effort to terminate illegal trade in endangered wildlife. One
recent well-publicized goal of the organization is to protect the bright plumed parrots that inhabit
the South American rain forests, such as the endangered Spix's Macaws. The United States receives
30,000-50,000 birds annually, a significant number of which are endangered species. TAFFIC
(South America) Makes a Difference, Focus-World Wildlife Fund Newsletter, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 2
(Vol. 10, No. 4).
The World Wildlife Fund ("WWF") has also helped to save endangered species by signing
major debt-for-nature swaps with countries that traditionally export endangered wildlife. In addi-
tion to supporting successful debt for nature deals in Ecuador, the Philippines, and Costa Rica, its
latest swap was with Madagascar. The proceeds from a $3 billion debt-for-nature agreement will be
used over a three-year period to benefit Madagascar's varied wildlife, which includes 45 lemur spe-
cies, 150 endemic frog species, and large rain forests. WWF and Madagascar Swap Debt for Nature,
Focus-World Wildlife Fund Newsletter, Fall 1989, at 1 (Vol. 11, No. 5).
The WWF signed Ecuador's largest debt-for-nature deal, agreeing to buy $5.4 million of the
country's outstanding commercial debt at highly discounted rates to assist in Ecuador's conservation
efforts. Ecuador's habitats, ranging from the Galapagos Islands to the Amazon, support over 1,400
species of birds, about 20,000 species of plants, and South America's only native bear. WWF Signs
Ecuador's Largest Debt-For-Nature Agreement, Focus-World Wildlife Fund Newsletter, May/June
1989, at 1 (Vol. 11, No. 3).
The WWFs swap with the Philippines was the first such deal in Asia. The Philippines has over
8,000 species of plants, 557 species of birds, and 165 species of mammals, many of which are
threatened with extinction. The WWF will purchase up to $2 million of the face amount of the
Philippines' external debt to benefit the Philippines' efforts to prevent both trade in threatened or
endangered wildlife and the destruction of their habitats. WWF Signs Major Debt-for-Nature Deal
with the Philippines, Focus-World Wildlife Fund Newsletter, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 4 (Vol. 10, No. 4).
23 Moorman, To Amend the Law on Illegal Trade in Wildlife, 93 L.A. DAILY 1. 529 (1980).
24 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1981).
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export, transport, sell, receive, acquire or purchase in interstate or for-
eign commerce... any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported or
sold in violation of any state or foreign law." The primary shortcoming
of this law is that its usefulness hinges upon the existence of satisfactory
state and foreign laws.26 Another problem with the Act is that it does
not take into account the fact that wildlife trade tends to involve uncom-
mon species. Thus, even after the Lacey Act, wildlife trade has placed
numerous species of plants and animals in danger of extinction.27
In 1967, the Eighth General Assembly of the International Union
for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources ('IUCN") resolved
to draft a treaty to combat the problem of decreasing biological diversity
through regulation of international trade.2 8 In March 1973, the IUCN
document formed the basis for CITES, which entered into force in July
1975. Currently, 102 countries are parties to this agreement.29
III. THE CONVENTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION
A. The Framework of CITES
CITES creates a system of permit requirements designed to obstruct
international trade in endangered species. 3 0 The drafters of the Conven-
tion chose to protect over 1,500 species of fauna and flora, and the signa-
tories have listed more protected species -by amendment since the
drafting.3 ' The most important qualification of the treaty was its ac-
25 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (1981). The Lacey Act Amendments thus restrict trade in wildlife
only if a state or foreign law prohibits such trade. The legislative history of the Lacey Act amend-
ments makes clear that the Act applies to fish or wildlife introduced to or removed from any state or
foreign country in violation of its laws. 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 1755.
26 Palmer, Endangered Species Protection: A History of Congressionalction, 4 ENvm. Ass. 255,
264 (1975) [hereinafter Palmer].
27 According to the U.S. Department of the Interior, approximately 300 species are in danger of
extinction every decade. H.R. REP. No. 167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1979).
28 Comment, Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Species Convention: Reservations Regard.
ing the Reservation Clauses, 14 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 429, 430 (1981). CITES deals solely with wild-
life that crosses national borders and does not address the need to protect the species' habitats.
Habitat destruction is perhaps the most serious danger to wildlife species.
29 CITES Bans All Trade in Elephant Ivory, Focus-World Wildlife Fund Newsletter, Special
Report 1990, at 1 (Vol. 12, No. 1).
30 CITES, supra note.9; S. ExEc. REP. No. 14, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); Kosloff & Trexler,
supra note 21, at 330.
31 Secretariat of the Convention [on International Trade in Endangered Species], Proceedings of
the Third Meeting of'the Conference of the Parties, Doe. 3.31 (New Delhi, India, Feb. 25 - Mar. 8,
1981). Article XI of CITES provides that the parties should convene at least once every two years,
unless they decide otherwise. At the conferences, the signatories are required to review the imple-
mentation of the Convention. The members may consider reports made by any party, review the
progress made toward preserving listed species, and make recommendations for ameliorating the
Convention's effectiveness, such as by listing more species.
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knowledgment of the differing degrees of vulnerability of various species
to endangerment.3z Each species is listed under one of three "appendi-
ces" depending on its vulnerability to extinction.33 The restrictions on
trade consequently differ for each appendix.34
Appendix I species are those "threatened with extinction which are
or may be affected by trade.' 3 5 International trade in specimens of these
species is subject to especially strict regulation.3 6 Appendix IE lists all
wildlife whose survival may be endangered unless trade is subject to strict
regulation. 7 Appendix HI contains species that have been identified by
any member country as subject to protective regulation within its juris-
diction for the purpose of preventing exploitation.- Although the condi-
tions for trade set forth for Appendices H and III species are less
stringent than those for Appendix I species, these species are still subject
to rigid control.
39
For all three categories, the export, import, and re-export of any
specimen of a listed species requires the prior grant and presentation of a
permit or a certificate of origin.0 The conditions are most rigorous for
the export of specimens of species listed in Appendix I. In order to ex-
port Appendix I species, a Scientific Authority of the exporting state
must determine that the export will not be detrimental to the survival of
the species, and a Management Authority of the same state must find
that the specimen was not acquired in violation of the laws of that state.
32 M. Bean, The Evolution of National wildlife Law 325 (1983).
33 C rES, supra note 9, art. IL
34 Id;
35 Id. Appendix I species face extinction and their survival is, or may be, further jeopardized by
the international wildlife trade.
36 For the purposes of the treaty, "trade" means export, import, re-export, or introduction from
the sea. Re-export of a species means that the species has previously been imported. Id., art.I. For
example, if otter skins are exported from Alaska to Canada, and subsequently exported from Canada
to the United States or any other country, the export from Canada is a "re-export" since the skins
had previously been imported to Canada. U.S. Fish & wildlife Service v. Kingery, 4 O.R.W. 239
(1985) (Ocean Resources & Wildlife Reports). "Introduction from the sea" refers to the transporta-
tion of species or specimens of species (live or dead plants or animals) which were taken in the
marine environment and not under the jurisdiction of any state. CITES, supra, note 9, art. I.
37 CITES, supra note 9, art. IL Appendix H species presently do not face extinction, but the
exploitation likely to resUlt from flexible trade regulations would probably place them in danger of
extinction.
38 a Appendix H1 species are protected by at least one of the Convention's signatories. The
long-term survival of these species, however, is not ensured by a single member's protective regula-
tions. These species also need all the members to cooperate to restrict their exploitation.
39 Ar, arts. MI, IV, & V. See infra text accompanying notes 40-46.
40 A certificate of origin, granted by a Management Authority, states the country from which
the wildlife was originally exported. Each certificate contains the title of the Convention, the name
and stamp ofthe Management Authority issuing it, and a control number assigned by that authority.
CITES, supra note 9, art. VI.
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Additionally, any living specimen must be transported in a manner mini-
mizing the possible risk of injury to the specimen. Finally, there must be
evidence that an import permit has been issued for the specimen.4' The
requirements for an Appendix II export permit are similar to those for an
Appendix I permit, except that the Convention does not require an im-
port permit for the acquisition of an export permit.42
. The import of an Appendix I species requires the prior grant of an
import permit and either an export or re-export certificate. An import-
ing state must reach three findings before issuing an import permit to the
trader: (1) a Scientific Authority of the importing state must determine
that the import will not be detrimental to the survival of the species; (2)
the Scientific Authority must also conclude that the recipient is ade-
quately equipped to care for the specimen; and, most importantly, (3) a
Management Authority of the importing state must be satisfied that the
specimen is not to be used primarily for commercial purposes.4 In order
to import an Appendix H1 species, the Convention only requires the prior
grant of an export or re-export certificate.44
Regulations involving the re-export of Appendix I species require
that a Management Authority of the state of re-export finds that the
specimen was imported into that state in compliance with CITES, that
any living specimen will be shipped in a manner minimizing the risk of
injury to the living specimen, and that an import permit be issued.45 Re-
export of species listed in Appendix II has the same requirements as Ap-
41 Id., art. III; United States v. 3,210 Crusted Sides of Caimun Crocodilus Yacare, 636 F. Supp.
1281, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (if hides were Appendix I species, their export would require a "no-
detriment" finding, minimal injury during transport, and grant of an import permit).
42 CITES, supra note 9, art. IV; Defenders of Wildlife v. Endangered Species Scientific Author-
ity, 725 F.2d 726, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (without a valid "no detriment" finding, bobcats, an Appen-
dix H species, may not be exported legally); United States v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets,
689 F. Supp. 1106, 1114 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (export of Appendix II birds from Peru required that the
Management Authority in Peru be satisfied that the birds were not obtained in contravention of
Peruvian law). In order to obtain an export permit for an Appendix III species, a Management
Authority of the state of export must be satisfied that the specimen was obtained in compliance with
the laws of the state and that any living specimen will be handled in a humane manner. CITES,
supra note 9, art. V.
43 CITES, supra note 9, art. III; World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, WL 66193 (D.D.C. 1988) (im-
port of Appendix I giant pandas must not be for primarily commercial purposes).
44 CITES, supra note 9, art. IV; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Kingery, 4 O.RW. 239 (1985)
(trader is liable for import of Appendix II river otter skins from Canada without valid re-export
permit from Canada); Rittenberry v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2 O.R.W. 2089 (1980) (it is
unlawful to import into the United States Appendix II polar bear skins unless a valid foreign export
permit or valid foreign re-export certificate was obtained prior to such importation). The import of
Appendix III species requires a certificate of origin, and if the state of origin has included the species
in Appendix III, an export permit is also necessary. CITES, supra note 9, art. V.
45 CITES, supra note 9, art. III.
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pendix I species with the exception that no import permit is necessary.
46
B. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
In 1973, in response to CITES, Congress enacted the ESA, which
places restrictions on the importation and exportation of endangered
wildlife and its products.4 7 Compared to prior federal legislation relating
to endangered species conservation, the ESA substantially broadened the
scope of protection for endangered wildlife. For example, the ESA
strengthened civil and criminal penalties for offenders.48 In addition, the
Act accorded protection to plants for the first time.49
The ESA designates the Secretary of the Interior as the Manage-
ment Authority and the Scientific Authority responsible for the Conven-
tion's implementation.50 The primary responsibility of the Management
Authority is to grant and authenticate permits for wildlife trade on be-
half of the United States in compliance with the articles in the Conven-
tion.5 1 The Scientific Authority is responsible for investigating wildlife
shipments and making the technical determinations necessary to ensure
compliance with the Convention.52 The Scientific Authority's obliga-
tions include overseeing applications for the import and export of listed
species, evaluating the status of wildlife by trade, and making determina-
tions regarding the adequacy of the housing and care of protected
species.
3
The ESA also states that the respective functions of each authority
4 6 Id, art. IV. Re-export of Appendix III species mandates that a Management Authority of the
state of re-export issue a re-export certificate as proof to the state of import of compliance with the
Convention. Id, art. V.
47 EiSA, supra note 14, § 1538. According to CITES, art. VIII, the Convention's signatories
must promulgate laws to enforce the treaty provisions. The ESA is more broadly defined than
CITES since the treaty is limited by its terms to international trade. The legislation implementing
CITES comprises only a small portion of the ESA (Le-, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(4)(0, 1532(4), 1537(a)
and 1538(c)). The stated purposes of the ESA are to conserve ecosystems, provide a program to
conserve threatened or endangered species, and to achieve the purposes of treaties, including CITES.
48 Under the Endangered Species Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 688 (1969), repealed by the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543, the maximum monetary criminal penalty
that could be imposed was $10,000, and civil liability ran up to $5,000. The ESA doubled these
figures, so that criminal penalties now run up to $20,00, and the maximum civil liability is $10,000.
ESA, supra note 14, §§ 1540(a)-(b); Coggins, Federal Wildlife Law Achieves Adolescence: Develop-
ments in the 1970s, 1978 DuKE LJ. 753, 805.
49 ESA, supia note 14, § 1531.
50 Ird § 1537a(a).
51 CITES, supra note 9, art. IX; Coggins & Harris, The Greening ofAmerican Law?: The Recent
Evolution of Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 246, 275 (1987)
(citing 10 ENDANOERED SPECIES TECH. BULL. 11 (Jan. 1985)) [hereinafter Coggins & Harris].
52 CITES, supra note 9, arts. III, IV.
53 Coggins & Harris, supra note 51, at 276.
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are to be executed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS").5 4
Both the FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service are responsible
for administering the ESA,5 5 but the FWS is the agency responsible for
the Convention's implementation.5 6 The two arms of the FWS are the
Wildlife Permit Office ("WPO") and the Office of the Scientific Author-
ity ("OSA"). The WPO acts as the CITES Management Authority,
while the OSA acts as the Scientific Authority.
When the WPO and the OSA conclude that an importer or exporter
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States has violated the Conven-
tion, the FWS usually institutes a penalty proceeding against that person.
These proceedings take place in the Interior Department's Office of
Hearings and Appeals. An administrative law judge ("AUJ") presides at
these hearings and acts as an impartial examiner.5 7 The ALJ essentially
plays the role of a trial judge in the administrative adjudication process."
The decisions of the AILJs in assessing penalties constitute final adminis-
trative action on a particular matter, but a dissatisfied party may appeal
the decision of the AUJ to the Appeals Board of the Interior Depart-
ment. 9 The final agency decision is then subject to judicial review upon
the demand of a party with standing.6'
C. Structural Problems in the ESA and CITES Which
Hinder Law Enforcement
Despite the enactment of the ESA and CITES, illegal trade in wild-
life persists. This problem is partly attributable to inefficient enforcement
of the ESA. For instance, the extremely inadequate staffing of the FWS
prevents the agency from conducting inspections on a vast number of
undeclared shipments.61 This deficiency may encourage illegal trade in
wildlife.
A second problem is that ESA regulations permit customs officers to
5 4 ESA, supra note 14, § 1537a(a). The regulations promulgated under the ESA and CITES are
at 50 CF.R. §§ 14.1-14.204 (1988) and 50 C.F.R. §§ 23.1-23.257 (1988), respectively.
55 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (1989).
56 ESA, supra note 14, § 1537a(a).
57 W. GELLHORN, C. BysE, P. STRAuss, T. RAKOFM, & IL SCHOTLAND, ADwMNmS-RATrvE
LAW, CASES AND CoMMENS 862 (1987).
58 The AIJ is entirely a creation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C § 556 (1976).
Pursuant to this Act, the AUJ may administer oaths, rule on offers of proof, take testimony, and
make or recommend decisions.
59 Rittenberry v. U.S. Fish & wildlife Service, 2 O.R.W. 2089 (1980). The Appeals Board is
composed of AL.1s as well.
60 Association of Data Processing Services Organization v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
61 Regulation ofInternational Trade supra note 18, at 269. Approximately 85,000 shipments of
wildlife and wildlife products enter the United States annually, and there are only about 70 wildlife
inspectors spread over nine ports of entry. Telephone interview with Tom Strigler, Agent, Law
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clear wildlife shipments if an FWS agent 2 does not appear "within a
reasonable time."6 The term "reasonable time" has not been defined by
the courts, leaving customs agents with much discretion to determine
when a shipment may clear customs without investigation by an FWS
agent.
An additional deficiency in the ESA regulations is that FWS agents
and customs officers who are responsible for clearing wildlife are not obli-
gated to refuse clearance of shipments, even if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that CITES has been violated."4 The regulations sim-
ply provide that the officers "may" (not "shall") refuse clearance if it is
reasonable to conclude that the conditions of the Convention have not
been satisfied."5
Moreover, a number of flexible exceptions to the Convention's re-
quirements create defects in the statutory regime which impede the en-
forcement efforts of the FWS. For example, the ESA contains an 'undue
economic hardship" exemption which provides a serious loophole in the
statute that dealers exploit.66 This provision enables the FWS to exempt
dealers from trade restrictions based on the private economic interests of
the trader. Other ESA exemptions make interpretation and enforcement
of the Convention even more perplexing. For instance, trade restrictions
are not supposed to apply to wildlife transshipped within the United
States.67 In addition, specimens are not subject to the import and export
requirements if they: (1) were acquired prior to the date the Convention
applied to them;6" (2) are for personal or household use;69 (3) are bred in
Enforcement Division, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 24, 1989) [hereinafter
Strigler interview].
Nime customs ports of entry are designated for the importation or exportation of wildlife listed
under CITES appendices: (1) Los Angeles, California; (2) San Francisco, California; (3) Miami,
Florida; (4) Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) Chicago, Illinois; (6) New Orleans, Louisiana; (7) New York,
New York, (8) Seattle, Washington; and ((9) Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas. 50 C.F.R. § 14.12 (1988).
Section 14.11 states that no person may import or export any wildlife at any place other than a
designated customs port of entry listed in § 14.12. For exceptions to this requirement see regula-
tions on border ports and special ports. 50 C.F.R. §§ 14.16, 14.19 (1988). In addition, fourteen U.S.
Department of Agriculture ports are designated for the importation, exportation, and re-exportation
of plants. 50 C.F.R. § 24.12 (1988).
62 FWS agents are trained in inspection of wildlife, while customs officials are not
63 50 C.F.R. § 14.54 (1988).
64 50 CF.R. § 14.53 (1988); Regulaflon of International Trade, supra note 18, at 271.
65 50 C.F.R. § 14.53 (1988). Instead of having discretion, service officers should be required to
refuse clearance of all shipments until they are sure the shipment is legal. Regulation oflnternational
Trade, supra note 18, at 271.
66 ESA, supra note 14, § 1539(bX1).
67 50 C.F.R. § 23.13(b) (1988). To qualify, wildlife or plants must remain in customs custody.
68 Id § 23.13(c).
69 Id § 23.13(d).
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captivity or are artificially propagated;7 ° or (4) are noncommercial loans,
donations, or exchanges between scientists or scientific institutions.7
The continued existence of rampant illegal trade in wildlife may also
be partly attributable to inadequacies in the language of the Convention
itself. Ambiguous and undefined phrases, such as "species threatened
with extinction," "affected by trade," "primarily commercial purposes,"
and "detrimental to the survival of the species" pervade CITES.72 Such
language makes it difficult for the FWS to construe and apply the law.
According to one source in the office of the Management Authority of
the FWS, one of the most pressing problems in international wildlife
trade is the failure of the member nations to jointly determine which
Appendix II species are in fact "affected by trade" or "threatened with
extinction."73 The majority of wildlife trade involves Appendix II spe-
cies.74 Because the Convention's phrases are vague and the signatories
have not yet convened to review the status of Appendix II species, it is
highly probable that there are many endangered species involved in for-
eigu commerce of which the parties are unaware.7"
70 Id § 23.13(f).
71 Id § 23.13(g).
72 Favre, Tension Points Within the Language of the CITES Treaty, 5 B.U. INT'L L.. 247, 252
(1987).
73 Telephone interview with Dick Robinson, Wildlife Permit Ofice, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Ser-
vice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 24, 1989) [hereinafter Robinson interview].
74 Id
75 The WPO proposes as a solution that the members meet and exchange their records of trade
in the species listed in the three appendices. This will enable the signatories to accurately transfer
Appendix H species to Appendix I if they identify the species as in danger of becoming extinct. Id
Pursuant to CITES, supra note 9, art. VIII, signatories are expected to submit annual reports on
their trade in CITES species. However, the World Trade Monitoring Unit in Cambridge, England
has found that in the early 1980s, approximately 70% of legal shipments of plants and animals went
unreported, and that the reporting which did take place was inaccurate. Report on National Reports
Under Article VIII, Paragraph 7 of the Convention, Docs. 5, 17 in Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting
of the Conference of the Parties (1987).
It is unlikely that exchanging incomplete records would help mitigate the harm confronting
numerous Appendix II species. However, the United States made an advancement when the U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Service reclassified African chimpanzees as an endangered species, granting them
more protection under the Convention and the ESA. U.S. Seeks to List Affrican Chimpanzees as
Endangered, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1989, at C4, col. 3. In addition, in October of 1989, the CITES
members decided to upgrade the status of the African elephant to Appendix I in order to lessen the
illegal trade in ivory. Letter from David Western, Director, Wildlife Conservation International
Nairobi (Nov. 1989) (In the United States, Wildlife Conservation International is located in the
Bronx, NY).
Another alternative would be to impose quotas on the import and export of certain species. The
Convention currently does not have a quota system, but it may prove useful in preventing the loss of
countless Appendix H species. Robinson interview, supra note 73. The United States, for example,
presently has a quota on the import of leopard skins. It is likely that soon it will impose a second
quota on trade in reptile skins, another commonly traded Appendix 11 species. Id
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From the perspective of the FWS Scientific Authority, the most seri-
ous difficulty arising from ambiguous language in the Convention is the
problem of identifying unlawfdly traded wildlife.76 Article I defines
specimens of protected species as including any "readily recognizable
part or derivative of an animal listed on Appendix I or ILH . ." No
guidelines are provided for determining whether a specimen is "readily
recognizable as a protected species."
77
Another defect in the language of the Convention is its reservation
clauses, which permit any member nation to enter a reservation at the
time a species is listed on an appendix, making the country a non-party
to the agreement insofar as that species is concerned. 78 While reserva-
tion provisions may be valuable in international protocols to ensure that
no country is coerced into taking specific action, these clauses in CITES
are partly responsible for the continued commercial exploitation that
threatens endangered wildlife. In sum, the numerous structural deficien-
cies in the statutory framework of the Convention seem to inhibit strict
CITES enforcement and do not paint a promising picture of administra-
tive success in enforcing the Convention.
IV. ENFORCENmNT OF CITES
A. The Effectiveness of Administrative Action
Under the amendments to the ESA, "any person who knowingly
violates, and any person engaged in business as an importer or exporter
of fish, wildlife or plants who violates any provision of this chapter...
may be assessed a civil penalty... ."" The language of this provision
suggests that importers and exporters of wildlife are strictly liable for
violations of the ESA since they need not intentionally or "knowingly"
violate the Act as other people must do in order to be fined.
76 Strigler interview, supra note 61.
77 The OSA suggests that comprehensive coverage of the protected species, with photographs, be
added to CITES to facilitate the identification process. Id
Coggins and Harris, supra note 51, at 276, argue that identifying plant protected species is the
most difficult aspect ofimplementing CITES. Like the OSA, they propose that identification manu-
als be added to the treaty to facilitate the inspectors" responsibilities. Coggins and Harris also argue
that CITES enforcement for plants is very much complicated by the distinction in trade regulations
for artificially propagated plants as opposed to field collected plants, since it is difficult to distinguish
them. Because the former are exempt from CITES regulations, it is likely that dealers will intention-
ally mislabel field collected specimens as artificially propagated plants. Id at 276-77.
78 CITES, supra note 9, arts. XV(3), XVI(2), and XXI. The United States, however, has not
yet entered a single reservation. Robinson interview, supra note 73. For a detailed discussion of
difficulties arising from the reservation provision, see Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Speo
cles Convention: ceservatfonsRegarding the Reservation Clauses, 14 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 429 (1981).
79 ESA, supra note 14, § 1540(a)(1).
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The legislative history of the ESA confirms this interpretation. In
1973, the ESA stated that "any person who knowingly violates, or who
knowingly commits an act in the course of commercial activity which
violates any provision of this chapter... may be assessed a civil pen-
alty .... ,,so The later removal of the word "knowingly" in the descrip-
tion of the penalties imposable on commercial operators elucidates that
Congress intended to hold importers and exporters strictly liable under
the Act."1 Given the penalty provision of the ESA, it seems as though
the United States has the requisite legislation to enforce the Convention
rigorously and to deter offenders. An examination of the administrative
process, however, reflects administrative reluctance to strictly enforce
CITES and the ESA.
L The ALU
On the whole, the decisions of the AIJs in the U.S. Department of
the Interior's Office of Hearings and Appeals are unduly lenient toward
offenders.8 2 The orders by the ALJs inappropriately excuse offenders, for
they fail to impose significant penalties, when they impose penalties at
all, on violators of the Convention and the ESA, even under the strict
liability provisions of the ESA. 
8 3
For example, in Rittenberry v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,s8 a tour-
ist imported a polar bear skin rug and a gray wolf skin rug (both Appen-
dix II species) from Canada to the United States without the requisite
export permits. The AUJ imposed a $200 penalty, and the respondent
appealed. The salient section of the ESA applied a strict liability stan-
dard to the violation since Congress did not intend to make knowledge of
the law a prerequisite to imposition of a civil penalty.8" Nonetheless, the
Appeals Board focused exclusively on the intent of the importer in reach-
ing its order, which imposed only a $2 penalty, $1 for each violation of
the ESA. 6 The Board's decision ignored critical factors, such as the sen-
80 Id § 1540(a)(1) (amended 1978).
81 The legislative history states as follows:
The amendment reduces the strict liability penalty for others than importers and exporters to
$500... and subjects importers and exporters offish and wildlife and plants to strict liability
penalties of up to $10,000....
Newell v. Baldridge, 548 F. Supp. 39, 43 (W.D. Wa. 1982) (quoting HLR. REP. No. 95-1804, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9453, 9493. A civil
penalty may be imposed for an act which violates the ESA of 1973 without a showing of intent to
violate the law. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Swyke, 3 O.R.W. 522 (1984).
82 See infra text accompanying notes 84-95.
83 Id
84 Rittenber-y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2 O.R.W. 2089 (1980).
85 See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
86 Rittenberry, 2 O.R.W. 2089.
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ousness of the offense, the ensuing harm to wildlife resources, the possi-
ble deterrent effect upon other violators, as well as the implementation of
congressional intent in promulgation of the statute.87
The AILJ decisions revolve around the offender's intentions when
violating the law, even when the violation is a blatant mistake of which
the offender should have been aware. In U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v.
Kingery,2s a fur dealer imported 39 river otter skins (Appendix II spe-
cies) into the United States from Canada. The trader failed to obtain a
valid re-export certificate from the country of re-export prior to the im-
portation. 9 Unlike the tourist in Rittenberry, the respondent in Kingery
was a professional trader who should have been attentive to the CITES
permit requirements.
The ESA provides that any violation of the Convention is punish-
able by a maximum civil penalty of $500 on a strict liability basisf 0 Ig-
noring the strict liability standard, the AUI assessed a nominal $1
penalty, reasoning that the importer's reliance on other people to obtain
proper documentation suggested that the trader did not intentionally
evade the CITES regulations, and since the purpose of a civil penalty is
deterrence, there was no need to impose a fine. 1 This decision is fraught
with problems. First, the A.'s determination hinged on the dealer's
intent when violating the Act, even though as an importer, the dealer
should have been strictly liable for breaking the law. In addition, the
AI's conclusion that the importer was an "innocent offender" is per-
turbing, for unlike a tourist, a professional trader should have taken steps
to obtain essential permits.
Where the law has been violated intentionally, the Department of
the Interior has still been reluctant to impose the maximum penalty. For
example, in US. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sissoko,92 an importer of Afri-
can objects imported wildlife items that he knew were on the threatened
or endangered species list (Appendix H elephant ivory and teeth, and an
Appendix I primate skull) without adequate documentation. The pro-
posed assessment of $2,500 was reduced to a mere $200, despite the fact
that the ESA allows maximum fines of $10,000 for unlawful trade in
endangered species and $500 for illegal trade in threatened species.
Although intent is irrelevant for commercial importers or exporters
under the applicable strict liability provisions of the ESA, the AI deci-
87 I
88 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Kingery, 4 O.R.W. 239 (1985).
8 9 Id See supra text accompanying notes 43-44 on the import of Appendix II species.
90 ESA, supra note 14, § 1540(a)(1); see supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
91 Kingery, 4 O.R.W. 239.
92 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sissoko, 2 O.R.W. 507 (1981).
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sions show that the existence of good faith is an important mitigating
"circumstance in determining the severity of the penalty imposed. Even
taking this into account, it is unclear how the ALT in Sissoko could have
reduced the penalty to $200 when the importer was not an innocent
bystander.
More disturbing than the lenience displayed in violations involving
CITES Appendix II species is the lenience exhibited in offenses involving
Appendix I species, which should be subject to the strictest regulations
under the Convention. In U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Starr,93 the
respondent imported 20 green sea turtles (Appendix I species) from the
Philippines to the United States. The importer did not possess the im-
port permit required by the Convention. Under the ESA, this offense is
punishable by up to $10,000 on a strict liability basis. 94 Moreover, the
box holding the turtles was labeled "pantherfish," an unlisted species,
suggesting that the importer attempted to circumvent the laws. The
ALT, however, held that since no definitive evidence established that the
importer intended to violate the ESA, the appropriate fine was $50.
Once again, the civil penalty imposed was negligible, although the species
involved was endangered, and the mislabeling was not demonstrated to
be an innocent error.95
2. The FWS
Under the ESA and CITES, the FWS is empowered to fine offenders
of the Convention in civil penalty proceedings. To date, however, the
FWS has not fully exercised this authority.96 The Secretary of the Inte-
rior, acting through the FWS, may impose civil penalties of up to
$10,000 on. persons who intentionally violate the Convention, and for
importers and exporters who violate the Convention, the Secretary may
impose such penalties whether the violations were knowing or not.97
Nevertheless, the FWS seldom seeks to assess a penalty harsh enough to
comport with the severity of the offense committed. It appears that the
agency, like the ALIs, inappropriately allows the good faith element to
93 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Starr, 2 O.R.W. 1 (1979).
94 ESA, supra note 14, § 1540(aX1); see supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
95 Starr, 2 O.R.W. 507. Rather than considering the frame of mind of the offender in assessing
the penalties, it may be more appropriate to consider the harm likely to result from removing the
species from their habitats. See also U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Cherry, 3 O.R.W. 320 (1983) (no
penalty imposed on importer of Appendix I rhinoceros trophies because of good faith effort to pro-
cure necessary permits).
96 It may be problematic to separate the ALUs from the agency implementing the treaty because
the ALIs are often under subtle pressures to encourage rulings that do not displease agency officials.
Are Judge and Agency Too Close for Justice?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1989, sec. 4, at 2, col. 4.
97 ESA, supra note 14, § 3540(a)(1).
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water down penalties. The AUJ rarely imposes higher sanctions than
those sought by the FWS, and often chooses to reduce the penalty assess-
ment.98 If the FWS were to seek higher fines in complaints against the
Convention's violators, there would be a better chance that the offenders
would be more strictly penalized by the ALJs.99
In Appendix I cases, the FWS has repeatedly imposed small penal-
ties on importers and exporters. For example, in U.S. Fish & Wildliife
Service v. Cherry, the FWS sought only a $500 fine for the importation of
rhinoceros trophies in contravention of CITES."00 In Starr, a mere $50
penalty was imposed for the importation of endangered green sea turtles
without valid permits.' In Sissoko, the respondent's effort to import an
endangered gorilla's skull clearly could have been penalized by up to a
$10,000 fine, especially since it was a willful violation of the law. The
FWS imposed only $1,500, however, which was reduced to an insignifi-
cant $200 in the civil penalty proceedings.1 "2
In one proceeding brought under the Lacey Act, the FWS did seek
to assess the maximum penalty, and the proceeding ended in a strict pen-
alty assessment, even after the AUJ decided the case.103 The AUJ did not
sustain the FWS' $20,000 charge, but it ordered a $10,000 penalty. 4
Although this case involved the Lacey Act, the same administrative bod-
ies were involved as would be in CITES cases. If the FWS becomes more
rigorous in its enforcement of CITES, perhaps it will improve the deter-
rent effect of the ESA in preventing violators from over-exploiting endan-
gered or threatened species through international trade.
Minimal plant protection also points to the FWS' weak enforcement
of CITES. Over 10 million CITES species plants enter the United States
per year,' °5 but the FWS' first enforcement action for wild flora occurred
11 years after the United States ratified the treaty. 0 6 It is likely that
many of the millions of plants brought into this country prior to 1986
were transported contrary to the rules of the Convention; however, it
98 See infra text accompanying notes 100-102.
99 See infra text accompanying notes 103-104.
100 Cherry, 3 O.R.W. 320. This assessment was eventually vacated by the AL
101 Starr, 2 O.R.W. I. The AIT sustained the assessment which may well have been higher had
the FWS made it so in the complaint.
102 Sissoko,'2 .R.W. 507.
103 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Jacobson, 4 O.R.W. 754 (1986). The FWS is responsible for
administering the Lacey Act.
104 Id.
105 Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 21, at 329.
106 Nine people were charged with illegal importation of Appendix I cacti from Mexico. Memo-
randum from Faith T. Campbell to ESA Contacts (June 20, 1986) (available from Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Washington, D.C.); Coggins & Harris, supra note 51, at 276-77.
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took the FWS over a decade to institute proceedings for the illegal trade
of CITES species plants.
B. Judicial Review
As long as administrative enforcement of CITES is weak, the role of
the judiciary in reviewing administrative action remains a serious consid-
eration. The courts may act as valuable checks on agency decisions,
strengthening sanctions when appropriate, to ensure that the United
States meets the goals of the Convention.
L Availability of Review
According to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), °7 the
APA provisions for judicial review apply "except to the extent that: (1)
statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."103 Thus, the APA does not have all or noth-
ing consequences. Where statutory preclusion or agency discretion is
partial, as is most often the case, the APA law on judicial review would
also apply in part. Although the ESA contains a provision authorizing
judicial review under only one subsection of the statute, 0 9 the ESA does
not preclude review in any way.110 Thus, only the extent of matters
wholely within agency discretion is of concern in considering whether
judicial review is available in CITES enforcement cases. It is common
for the Secretary, acting through the FWS, to employ a discretionary
standard in making relevant determinations"' It would be a rare occur-
rence, however, for the Secretary to have complete discretion in enforc-
ing CITES.
112
An example of this uncommon situation, where agency action was
deemed by the Supreme Court to fall within the narrow area completely
committed to agency discretion, is found in Heckler v. Chaney.' 3 The
question presented in Heckler was whether the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's ( TDA") decision not to enforce the approval requirements of
the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act was judicially reviewable. Analogiz-
107 The APA is the law governing practice and proceedings before administrative agencies.
108 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976) [hereinafter APA].
109 ESA, supra note 14, § 1536(n) permits judicial review of any administrative decision under
ESA § 1536(h), which is entitled "grant of exemption." Only upon the submission of an application
for exemption to the ESA requirements will there be an express authorization of judicial review.
110 "Only upon clear and convincing evidence of contrary legislative intent should the courts
restrict access to judicial review." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
111 American Cetacean Soe'y v: Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds
sub. nor., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
112 See infra text accompanying notes 113-117.
113 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
U.S. Enforcement of Endangered Species Convention
10:541(1990)
ing the case to one of prosecutorial discretion, the Court held that the
FDA's decision on whether or not to enforce a statute was completely
within its discretion, and thus was judicially unreviewable under the
AA.114
The rule enunciated in Heckler does not limit the availability ofjudi-
cial review in CITES enforcement cases unless the FWS has chosen to be
"inactive" or not to. enforce the ESA penalties. In cases of lenient agency
decisions, however, Heckler would not restrict access to judicial review
since the court would be reviewing a decision under a statute that the
agency has already chosen to enforce.
Another situation where judicial review is unavailable because ad-
ministrative action is completely committed to agency discretion is when
there is "no law to apply.""1 5 The legislative history of the APA indi-
cates that the exception is applicable in those unusual instances where
statutes are drawn in such extremely broad terms that in a given case
there is no standard to apply.116
In the ESA and CITES enforcement context, the language of the
Convention and its statutory correlate is not so wide-ranging that it pro-
vides no guidelines or rules to apply in enforcement decisions. In Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 117 the Supreme Court held that a
statute prohibiting the Secretary of Transportation from approving any
project requiring "use of any publicly owned land... unless there is no
feasible and prudent alternative" was not too broad to provide standards
to apply, despite the fact that the language granted the Secretary much
discretion in determining what constituted "feasible" and "prudent" al-
ternatives. Similarly, typical phrases in CITES and ESA provisions, such
as "affected by trade" and "threatened with extinction," may be deemed
ambiguous, but they nonetheless furnish a workable standard to apply.
In sum, judicial review of administrative enforcement of CITES is usu-
ally available. It is only when the FWS fails to institute a proceeding
that such "inaction" raises a presumption of nonreviewability.
2. "Arbitrary or Capricious" Standard
Although case law involving CITES and the ESA is not expansive,
existing cases on the subject reflect a discernible tendency for courts to
defer to lenient administrative decisions, -even though judicial review is
114 Id
115 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
116 Id. at 410 (citing S. REP'. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1945)).
117 Id. at 411.
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available.11 The ESA does not contain any provision defining or cir-
cumscribing the standard of review applicable under the statute.11 9
However, cases from various jurisdictions establish that the appropriate
standard of review under the ESA is the "arbitrary or capricious" stan-
dard.120 Under this standard, a court "must consider whether the
agency's decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."'
12
Although this standard seems relatively straightforward, it is sus-
ceptible to differing constructions. For example, both Motor Vehicles
Manufacturer's Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.122 and Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC 123 purport to employ
the arbitrary or capricious standard; yet, both decisions do not accord
the courts the same degree of freedom in reviewing agency determina-
, 118 See supra notes 79-95 and accompanying text for discussion establishing that administrative
enforcement of the Convention in fact has been lax. See infra notes 128-146 and accompanying text
for discussion of WWF v. Hodel and Caymun Turtle Far, Ltd. v. Andrus, cases illustratingjudicial
deference to agencies.
One case where the court carefully reviewed the administrative record is Defenders of Wildlife,
Inc. v. Endangered Species Scientific Auth., 659 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Wildife, Inc., an envi-
ronmental organization, alleged, that the Scientific Authority's guidelines were invalid since they
allowed the agency to conclude that the exportation of bobcats would not be detrimental to the
survival of the species without using dependable data. The reviewing court concluded that absent
adequate information on total bobcat population and the number to be killed in any particular sea-
son, there was no valid basis on which to conclude that there was "no detriment" Id. at 177.
Defenders of Wildlife has been criticized on the ground that the court was inappropriately re-
viewing a technidal agency.decision. Note, Defenders of Wildlife v. Endangered Species Scientific
Authority: The Court as Biologist, 12 ENV. LAW 773 (1982). Agreeing with this view, Congress
amended the ESA in 1982 to provide that the Secretary of the Inteior is not required to make
estimations on population size to reach a no-detriment determination..
119 The "substantial evidence" standard is most frequently used. Section 706(2)(e) of the APA
provides that the reviewing court shall set aside all agency determinations that it finds to be unsup-
ported by substantial evidence on the whole record. "Substantial evidence" refers to relevant evi-
dence that reasonably leads to a certain conclusion. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 223 (1938). The "whole record" means that the court must look at both sides of the record.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
120 Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678
(D.C. Cir. 1982); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.
1976); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comin'n v. U.S. E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).
Although the substantial evidence test is traditionally viewed as the more rigorous test, the
decision in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-142 (1973) indicates that the difference lies in whether
the agency's conclusions are made on the record. If so, the determinations must be supported by
substantial evidence. Thus, the distinction between the two is merely procedural. As Justice Scalia
noted in ADAPSO v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 745 F.2d 677, 683-84
(D.C. Cir. 1984), the substantial evidence stafidard does not connote a substantive standard of re-
view any different from the arbitrary and capricious standard.
121 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
122 Motor Vehicles Mfr.'s Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
123 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
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tions.124 While State Farm adopted an expansive view of the standard,
Baltimore Gas adopted a restrictive construction. Under the broad con-
struction, if an agency relies on improper factors, fails to consider impor-
tant aspects of the problem, or renders a decision that runs contrary to
the evidence or is so implausible that it cannot be considered a product of
agency expertise, its decision may be considered arbitrary or capri-
cious.125 This interpretation enables the reviewing court to take a "hard
look"e126 at the factual underpinnings of the agency's decision. On the
other hand, the narrow construction is more deferential, for it merely
requires that the agency be capable of rationally connecting the finding of
fact to the decision made.127
Thus, the extent to which a court may review agency decisions in
CITES enforcement cases varies dramatically depending on which prece-
dent the reviewing court chooses to follow. The most recent CITES en-
forcement case discussing the judicial review issue suggests that the
courts are adopting a deferential approach and are veering away from
conducting judicial review of agency decisions. In World Wildlife Fund
v. Hodel,121 the World Wildlife Fund ("WWF"), a non-profit conserva-
tion group, sought to enjoin the importation of two giant pandas (Appen-
dix I species) from China to the Toledo Zoo.129 These animals were
loaned to the zoo for purposes of being placed on non-breeding exhibi-
tion for 200 days.130
Agreeing with the FWS, the WWF Court decided that the ESA re-
quirement of enhancement of the survival of the species had been met,
and that the CITES criterion of a "no-detriment" finding had also been
satisfied. A closer look reveals, however, that the FWS may have had
insufficient evidence to arrive at the conclusion that the importation of
the pandas would enhance the survival of the species. The pandas were
placed on non-breeding public exhibition, and it was unclear whether
they were of breeding capability. If they were of breeding capability, it
was also unclear whether the 200-day loan extended into the next breed-
ing season. In effect, the FWS failed to consider these issues and as-
124 Comment, Deference to Discretion: Scalia's Impact on Judicial Review of Agency Action in an
Era of Deregulation, 38 HAsTnNGS L. 1223 (1987).
125 Motor Vehicles, 463 U.S. at 43.
126 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
127 Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 105.
128 WWF v. Hodel, WL 66193 (D.D.C. 1988).
129 The importation requirements are as follows: (1) the specimen will not be used for primarily
commercial purposes; (2) the importation will not be detrimental to the survival of the species; (3)
the importation is for scientific purposes or will enhance the survival of the species. CITES, supra
note 9, art. HI; ESA, supra note 14, § 1539(1)(A).
130 Hodel, WL 66193.
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sumed that the pandas were non-reproductive without definitive
evidence. Based on the information that was available on the breeding
potential of the pandas, the FWS' determination that the ESA and
CITES requirements had been met reflects the agency's poor assessment
of the situation. If the reviewing Court in WWF had adopted the State
Farm approach, which states that an agency's implausible conclusion or
its failure to consiier important aspects of a problem may render its deci-
sion arbitrary or capricious, perhaps WWF would have resulted in a sig-
nificantly harsher order.131
3. Judicial Reluctance to Broadly Review Administrative Action
Involving Statutory Interpretation: An Emerging Trend in
CITES cases?
Although case law enforcing the Convention is sparse, it is a grow-
ing body of law with some predictable patterns. Given the statutory re-
gime of the Convention and the numerous equivocal phrases in the treaty
and the ESA, it would seem that the most common enforcement
problems would stem from difficulties in statutory construction and in
applying the laws of the Convention to the facts of particular cases.1
32
The Convention is laden with ambiguous, poorly defined phrases. For
example, in Appendix I importation cases, it is fiecessary to make an
assessment of whether or not the import was for "primarily commercial
purposes."'133 Under Appendix H, it is always necessary in export and
import cases to determine whether trade will be "detrimental to the sur-
vival of the species."'" In order to export or import Appendix III speci-
mens, it is necessary to determine whether the specimen was transported
in a manner "minimizing the risk of injury or damage to health."'
13
The WWF case illustrates the role statutory interpretation can play
in affecting decisions in CITES enforcement cases. In WWF, the Court
enjoined the zoo from collecting additional fees to view the panda exhibit
on the grounds that compliance with the Convention requires that the
import not be for primarily commercial purposes. While the decision in
WFF is in favor of the conservationist plaintiff, the Court failed to con-
131 The court permitted the pandas to stay for the time agreed upon; however, the zoo was not
allowed to collect additional entry fees.
132 Under the ESA § 1538(c)(1), it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States to engage in any trade contrary to the provisions of the Convention, or to possess any
specimens traded contrary to the provisions of the Convention,-including the definitions of terms in
Article I. Thus, although CITES is not self-executing, it has been incorporated by reference into the
ESA and is consequently the law of the land.
133 CITES, supra note 9, art. III.
134 Ic art. IV.
135 Id art. V.
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sider important elements of the case. The commercial aspects of the case
extend beyond the issue of whether or not the zoo raised its entrance fees.
For example, the Court ignored the fact that the zoo still profited from
the increased visitation, regardless of the higher admission fees. In addi-
tion, the zoo profited from the sudden and dramatic increase in the sale
of panda paraphernalia.
The difficulty in construction of the phrase "primarily for commer-
cial purposes," which could possibly refer to monetary transactions, dis-
plays, or entertainment for profit,13 6 raises the question of the proper
scope of judicial review in WWF. The extent to which a reviewing court
can set aside agency decisions and findings depends upon whether the
issue involves a question of law or a question of fact.137 In some situa-
tions, the issue involves the application of law to fact.138  For judicial
review purposes, sometimes such issues are treated as questions of law
and sometimes as questions of fact.13 9 If the question requires statutory
interpretation in applying the law to the facts, it is viewed as a question
of law.14 Courts have held that for questions of law, the reviewing court
is empowered to substitute its interpretation for that of the agency.
14 1
In the CITES enforcement cases involving statutory interpretation,
however, courts are unwilling to review agency action aggressively and
extensively, even though they may be authorized to do so. For example,
in WWF, the Court noted that it was conducting a review of administra-
tive action under the arbitrary and capricious standard, but that it "may
136 Palmer, supra note 26, at 264.
137 Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504
(1951) (whether a particular act is within the scope of an injured party's employment is a question of
fact); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (whether foremen were "employees"
within the meaning of National Labor Relations Act was a question of law).
138 Packard, 330 U.S. 485.
139 .0Leary, 340 U.S. 504; Packard, 330 U.S. 485.
140 Packard, 330 U.S. 485; Office Employees v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) (question whether
with respect to an employee, labor organizations are "employers" within the meaning of NLRA was
issue of statutory construction that was question of law for courts); Railroad Retirement Board v.
Duquesne Warehouse Co., 326 U.S. 446 (1946) (eligibility of an employee for benefits under Retire-
ment Act was based on service to those included in Act's definition of "employer." Whether Ware-
house Company was employer was statutory construction issue for court); Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323
U.S. 624 (1945) (whether a plan under the Public Utility Holding Company Act may be "fair and
equitable" to preferred stockholders within the meaning of those words as used by the Act was
question of law for court); SEC v. Central-Iflinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949) (whether the
SEC's revised plan correctly applied the "fair and equitable" standard of the Public Utility Holding
Act was statutory construction matter for court); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 1244
(1944) (undefined term "public utility" under Public Utility Holding Act presented statutory inter-
pretation question for court).
141 In all of these cases, the reviewing court substituted its own judgment of the meaning of the
statutory term for that of the agency involved.
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not... substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.""
A series of cases from the 1940s, however, would enable thp WWF
Court to assume a more aggressive role in judicial review. For example,
in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 143 the question presented to the
Supreme Court was whether foremen and other supervisory employees
were entitled to certain rights assured to employees by the National La-
bor Relations Act ("NLRA"). This issue required the application of law
(the NLRA) to specific facts in order to determine whether foremen fell
within the meaning of the word "employees" under the NLRA. The
Court stated that this statutory interpretation problem presented a naked
question of law that fell within its own authority to decide.144
Applying the Supreme Court's opinion in Packard to WF would
require the WRWF Court to play a more active role in judicial review.
Like Packard, WWF involved the application of law (providing that "the
import [of pandas] not be for primarily commercial purposes") to a set of
facts. The meaning of "primarily commercial purposes" is unclear and is
susceptible to many interpretations. Under Packard, this statutory con-
struction issue is a question of law within the province of the courts to
handle. Thus, the WWF Court could have chosen to substitute its own
judgment for that of the FWS. 145 Analyzing WWF in this manner per-
mits the Court to adopt a more rigid interpretation of the law, resulting
in a significantly harsher order. 46
On the other hand, cases such as NLRB v. Hearst Publications147
provide that agency constructions of broad statutory terms must be ac-
cepted if they are reasonable. According to these cases, the WWF Court
was not wrong in stating that it was not able to substitute its own judg-
ment for that of the agency. However, the critical point is that courts
reviewing CITES enforcement actions are, in fact, empowered to replace
agency interpretations with their own interpretations.
142 WWF v. Hodel, WL 66193 (D.D.C. 1988).
143 Packard, 330 U.S. 485. See also K. DAVIS, ADminRATIVE LAW TREATiSE 370-81 (1984).
144 Ida
145 A similar type of analysis may be applied to Caymun Turtle Farm v. Andrus, 478 F. Supp.
125 (D.D.C. 1979). The reviewing court did not substitute'its own interpretation of the statutory
phrase "bred in captivity" in deciding whether Appendix I green sea turtles were exempted from
CITES.
146 If the WWF court wished to construe the phrase "not primarily for commercial purposes" as
encompassing a disapproval of not only special increased admission fees but also of profit reaped
from sales and greater visitation, perhaps the court would have more appropriately granted the
plaintiff's request of returning the giant pandas to their reserve in China. There are any possible
intrepretations of the term "commercial," each with differing policy implications as to how the court
should have decided WWF.
147 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (whether or not newsboys were employees
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act was a question of fact).
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Unfortunately, more contemporary judicial review cases merely
continue the Hearst line of reasoning. For example, in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Wang, 4 8 the meaning of the statutory term "ex-
treme hardship" was at issue. The Court failed to mention anything
about legislative history, however, and left the entire job of statutory in-
terpretation to the administrators. In one of the most prominent defer-
ence cases, Chevron v. NRDC,49 the Supreme Court plainly enunciated
the rule that, unless there is clear legislative intent on a statutory con-
struction, the judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a statute is
limited to a determination of whether it is a permissible construction of
the statute..
Nonetheless, Chevron and Wang do not overrule the Packard line of
cases, and there is currently a glaring inconsistency in the law. Just as
courts may choose between State Farm and Baltimore Electric & Gas, 50
they may also choose between Packard and the Hearst line of cases. In
enforcing CITES .and reviewing administrative action, courts must resist
deferring to agencies when they are not compelled to do so. Since admin-
istrative enforcement of the Convention is weak, the judiciary is integral
to ensuring that the purposes of CITES are met.
C. Forfeiture Under the ESA
Cases involving the forfeiture provisions of the ESA have cast a dif-
ferent light on the rigidity of enforcement of CITES.151 Perhaps this dif-
ference exists because no element of intent need be proven for any reason
in forfeiture cases, and no resort to the courts is necessary for wildife
valued at $100,000 or less. 52 Forfeiture actions have bden less problem-
atic in the courts than have the imposition of civil and criminal penalties.
For example, in United States v. 3,210 Crusted Sides of .Caimun
Crocodilus Yacare,153 the claimants entered into a joint venture for the
purpose of purchasing and shipping hides. The hides, imported in con-
travention of CITES and the ESA, were classified as Appendix II species
148 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
149 Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 122-127.
151 ESA, supra note 14, § 1540(e)(4)(A) provides:
All fish or wildlife or plants taken, possessed, sold, purchased, offered for sale or purchase,
transported, delivered, received, carried, shipped, exported or imported contrary to the provi-
sions of this Chapter, any regulation made pursuant thereto, or any permit or certificate issued
hereunder shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States.
152 Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 21, at 356.
153 United States v. 3,210 Crusted Sides of Caimun Crocodilus Yacare, 636 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.
Fla. 1986). Forfeiture actions are procedings in rem in which the property is considered to be the
offender.
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subject to strict regulation. While CITES requires that permits be origi-
nals or endorsed copies, the permit in this case was an unendorsed, xer-
oxed copy. In addition, CITES requires separate permits for each group
of specimens exported and that the correct number of hides be included
in the permit. In Caimun, since the bulk of the hides did not have appro-
priate documentation, the Court ruled that all of the hides were forfeita-
ble. *The Court reasoned that forfeiting only the offending portion of the
hides would function to thwart the purposes of, and undermine the effec-
tiveness of, CITES and the ESA.' 4 Quoting Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill,155 the Court stated that in enacting the ESA, Congress intended
to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost.
15 6
Another case illustrating the ease with which the courts have en-
forced the forfeiture provision of the ESA is United States v. 2507 Live
Canary Winged Parakeets.15 7 In this case, the claimant was Pet Farm, a
major importer of wildlife. The United States brought a successful forfei-
ture action against the birds obtained in Peru for export to Pet Farm.
The Court found that CITES was violated because the Peruvian official
that authorized the exportation of the parakeets did so contrary to Peru-
vian law.'58
In any event, the forfeiture actions by themselves are unlikely to
function as effective deterrents with respect to import and export viola-
tions under CITES and the ESA because forfeitures may simply be
vieWed by dealers in the business of illegal wildlife trade as a cost of'
doing business.' 59 It is only when there is a consistent and rigid enforce-
ment of civil and criminal sanctions that CITES will have an impact on
the behavior of illegal wildlife traders.
D. Summary
Although the United States has one of the most sophisticated
CITES implementation programs of all the signatories to the treaty, it
still has much room to improve. Administrative enforcement of the Con-
vention is very weak. The sanctions imposed on offenders by the AL~s
154 Id at 1257.
155 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Court held that despite the fact that millions of dollars had been expended on a big dam project, the
project would have to cease if the snail darter, an endangered species, would suffer the risk of extinc-
tion as a result of the completion of the dam project.
156 3,210 Crusted Sides, 636 F. Supp. at 1287.
157 United States v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets, 689 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
158 Id. at 1114-15.
159 Kosloff & Trexier, supra note 21, at 356.
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and the FWS are unduly low, even under the strict liability provisions of
the ESA. Unlike the imposition of civil penalties, the one area of CITES
enforcement that has met with some success is in forfeiture proceedings.
However, since deterrence is a major objective of the Convention and the
ESA, the successful "forfeiture actions are not of much import.
Given the lenient administrative enforcement of the Convention, the
judiciary is critical to ensuring that the United States meets the objectives
of CITES. Judicial review is usually available under the ESA, except in
those instances where agencies fail to institute proceedings. Case law es-
tablishes that the applicable standard of review under the ESA is the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard. The effectiveness of this standard de-
pends on how broadly it is interpreted. Courts should adopt a broad
construction because, in so doing, they can play an integral role in
CITES enforcement by taking a "hard look" at the factual underpinnings
of the agency's decision. Unfortunately, courts usually adopt the narrow
interpretation, which requires only a rational connection between the
facts and the agency's decision. This construction usually results in def-
erence to the agency's findings.
Although case law involving CITES and the ESA is not extensive,
existing cases and the nature of the statutory regime suggest that CITES
enforcement cases are most likely to arise from statutory interpretation
problems. The Convention is filled with ambiguous phrases that make
enforcement extremely complex. In cases involving statutory interpreta-
tion, the courts seem to defer to agency interpretations. Although con-
temporary cases are deferential to the agencies, there is precedent
authorizing courts to substitute their judgment for that of the agency
when an issue of statutory construction arises. It is essential that the
courts exercise this authority in order to strictly enforce the Convention.
CONCLUSION
Although CITES has been in effect for approximately 15 years, ille-
gal trade in wildlife is still rampant. Smugglers take advantage of the
tenuous connections between trading countries, and tourists continue to
buy items made from endangered species. Nevertheless, there is some
hope in this crisis. CITES has 102 members and is the most accepted
conservation agreement in the world. Furthermore, the major consum-
ers and producers of wildlife are now parties to the treaty.16o
The role the ESA will play in deterring the Convention's violators
depends on the degree to which the implementing legislation is used. To
160 S. Frrzomo.D, supra note 1, at 315.
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alleviate the serious problem of diminishing biological diversity world-
wide, it is necessary to adhere more closely to CITES and the ESA. 161
Administrative enforcement of CITES is overly flexible, and thus, a
greater judicial role is desirable. Given the volume of international trade
in wildlife, stricter regulation is necessary to deter the commercial ex-
ploiters of endangered species. The administrative agencies responsible
for implementing the ESA and CITES must be more rigid in their en-
forcement efforts by showing less sympathy for "innocent offenders"
under strict liability provisions and by imposing higher sanctions on the
violators. Further, the judiciary must play a more active role in provid-
ing a viable system of checks and balances, and not simply act as a rub-
ber stamp on agency action. When the courts improperly limit the scope
of their own review, they create a harmful barrier to determining cases
on their merits. Until the executive and judicial branches demonstrate
through their decisions a commitment to CITES and the ESA, we cannot
be sure that the full effectiveness of the Convention will be realized.
Meena Alagappan
161 There are, of course, other ways of mitigating the problem. First, in addition to CITES,
saving of wildlife requires that nations do not ignore the existence of black markets. Hope in the
Elephant Graveyard, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1989, at A22, col. 1. Recently, the WWF has been at-
tempting to convince the United States and the European Community to give substantial sums of
money to support anti-poaching efforts. Second, enforcement of the Convention has been weak
partly because of the insufficient number of wildlife inspectors at the ports of entry. The WWF's
Wildlife Rescue Campaign involves, among other things, the training of additional FWS staff to
examine shipments. WWFLaunches Vildlife Rescue Campaign, Focus-World Wildlife Fund News-
letter, Fall 1989, at 1 (Vol. 11, No. 5).- Finally, another way of helping to prevent the extinction of
certain species of fauna and flora is to breed Appendix I species in captivity, as has most recently
been done with the Siberian tiger and the gold monkey. For Threatened Species a Desperate Hope,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at C4, col 1; Gold Monkeys Learn How to Live in W1ld in Brazilian
Preserve, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1989, at C21, col. 1.
